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Abstract 
A forward reliability market is presented. The market coordinates new entry through the 
forward procurement of reliability options—physical capacity bundled with a financial 
option to supply energy above a strike price. The market assures adequate generating 
resources and prices capacity from the bids of competitive new entry in an annual 
auction. Efficient performance incentives are maintained from a load-following 
obligation to supply energy above the strike price. The capacity payment fully hedges 
load from high spot prices, and reduces supplier risk as well. Market power is reduced 
in the spot market, since suppliers enter the spot market with a nearly balanced position 
in times of scarcity. Market power in the reliability market is addressed by not allowing 
existing supply to impact the capacity price. The approach, which has been adopted in 
New England and Colombia, is readily adapted to either a thermal system or a hydro 
system. 
1  Understanding the generation adequacy problem 
The reliability of a power system depends on how it is operated in the short term (security) 
and medium term (firmness), but if there is not enough generating capacity, it will not be 
possible to serve all load and achieve security and firmness.
1 In this way, adequate generation is 
the most fundamental reliability issue, and it is also the one most distant from the spot market 
because it is the most long-term aspect of reliability. This paper focuses only on the long-term 
issue of generation adequacy, but the importance of the prescribed reliability-options approach to 
adequacy is that it facilitates the solution to the three worst problems of contemporary electricity 
markets: investment risk, market power and inefficient pricing.
2  
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the level of generation adequacy is not much of a problem 
because marginal generating capacity is relatively inexpensive when compared with other costs 
of delivered energy, and because, as with most optima, the derivative of net benefit with respect 
to capacity is zero at the optimal capacity level. For example, an extra 10% of capacity increases 
capacity costs by much less than 10% because peaking capacity is by far the cheapest kind of 
capacity, and adding peak capacity does not increase fuel costs, transmission costs or 
administrative costs. As a consequence, increasing total capacity by 10% will cost consumers 
only, perhaps, 2% extra. But there is some benefit to the resulting extra reliability. So the loss of 
net benefit is less than 2%. A good regulatory approach is unlikely to overshoot by more than 
10% on average, and the best market-based approach will not be perfect. Hence, the net benefit 
of improved adequacy from any market-based approach is necessarily quite small—likely less 
than 1% of total retail cost. The true cost of the adequacy problem has been the distortion of 
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2 These problems are actually solved by the capacity-market / reliability option design provided the rest of the 
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market designs by misguided attempts to solve it. These designs cause risks, inefficiencies and 
regulatory responses that are far more costly than any likely mistake in the provision of 
adequacy. Of course, the adequacy problem needs a solution, but that solution should not 
exacerbate already difficult aspects of electricity markets.  
The misconception most responsible for the current state of affairs is the notion that a 
cleverly designed “energy-only” market can induce optimal adequacy, or something close to it, 
even while the market has insufficient demand elasticity. Interestingly, when the notion of 
reliability markets was first developing back in the late 1990s, the importance of adequate 
demand response in an “energy-only” market was fully recognized. 
In this approach there is no price cap that limits the market price. It is assumed that the 
elasticity of demand to prices is enough to prevent any occurrences of market's failure 
to supply because of lack of generation adequacy. —Pérez Arriaga (1999) 
Unfortunately, when the idea of reliability options spread to the US, these assumptions were 
sometimes replaced with the idea that options priced only on the basis of their financial cost 
would solve the reliability problem in spite of a lack of sufficient demand elasticity. 
In an ideal market, with sufficient demand elasticity, the market always clears. This means 
there can be no adequacy problem because involuntary load shedding occurs only when the 
market fails to clear and demand exceeds supply. In a market that always clears, energy prices do 
not and cannot determine the level of reliability for, with respect to adequacy, the market is 
automatically 100% reliable. Instead, energy prices do what every economics text says they do, 
they determine the efficient (not reliable) level of capacity. Any less capacity would cause 
expensive voluntary load reductions, and any more capacity would mean that too much had been 
spent on capacity. The crucial point is that no energy-only market, even with ideal demand 
elasticity, can solve the adequacy problem. No energy market, on its own, can ever answer the 
question: “What level of capacity provides optimal reliability?” 
Of course if reliability is sold as a product, so that the customer can pay more to gain 
reliability, the market can answer the reliability question. But that is not an energy-only market, 
and it requires technology that is not yet in place. Rather than attempting a reliability market, it 
may be better to install real-time meters and use real-time pricing to increase elasticity to the 
point where the market becomes perfectly reliable with regard to adequacy. In principle this can 
be achieved with prices well below the Value of Lost Load (VoLL). As long as price stays below 
that level, such a market will be more efficient than an inelastic market with even a perfectly 
optimal level of adequacy. Still, one should not hope for dramatic efficiency gains because 
peaking capacity is cheap relative to the total cost of power. 
At present, you cannot buy more reliability than your neighbor, because you are on the same 
physical circuit and neighbors will always be blacked out together. Those who believe an energy 
market can solve the adequacy problem have simply misunderstood the economic theory of 
optimal investment. In a competitive market, optimal investment has nothing to do with 
reliability. 
Energy markets fall into one of two categories: (Case 1) they always clear and have no 
adequacy problem, or (Case 2) they can fail to clear and do have an adequacy problem. To 
classify a market correctly it is necessary to consider how it would perform without market 
power or regulation. Case 1 occurs when there is enough demand elasticity so that the supply and   3
demand curves always intersect as they do in any normal market. With the market clearing at all 
times, there will be a long-run capacity equilibrium, but it may not be efficient if the price 
sometimes exceeds the VoLL. VoLL varies with time, but at any given time it is the average that 
all consumers in the blackout region would pay to avoid the blackout.
3 Suppose this value is 
$2000 per MWh. It is quite possible for the demand curve to be downward sloping at $50,000 
per MWh or any other value. In this case the market could clear at $50,000 even though VoLL 
was only $2,000. Paying $50,000 for power that is only worth $2,000 is clearly inefficient, and 
because it pays suppliers too much, it causes excess entry, and the capacity level will end up 
inefficiently high. Economics does not predict, as many imagine, that simply because a market 
clears, it is efficient. Efficiency depends on all consumers expressing their demand in the market. 
With just enough demand elasticity to keep spot prices in Case 1 below VoLL, both risk and 
market power are almost certain to reach problematic levels.  Under such conditions, the 
regulated, reliability market described in this paper is still almost certain to outperform an 
unregulated energy-only market. Only when a market’s demand side is functioning quite 
normally and spot prices stay well below VoLL, is a pure energy market at all likely to 
outperform a good capacity market, and even then better investor coordination may favor the 
capacity market. 
Case 2, in which reliability is not guaranteed to be 100%, is the case considered in this 
paper. In most markets, few observers are willing to guarantee that involuntary load shedding is 
out of the question if the market is left to its own devices. Even so, some markets appear to be 
reliable on there own. Does this mean competitive energy prices are coming close to solving the 
reliability problem? Not at all. There are three possible explanations. First, suppliers may be 
exercising enough market power to attract new entrants. Monopoly power can easily produce 
more than enough reliability, but the resulting level has nothing to do with efficiency. Second, 
reliability can be the result of unrecognized regulatory interventions, such as tampering with the 
demand for operating reserves. Third, it is possible, though unlikely, that LSEs are expressing 
their own demand for reliability in a market that, in effect, is selling reliability to LSEs. For such 
an LSE-reliability market to work, the system operator would need to monitor LSE purchases of 
power, and the real-time performance of their suppliers, and cut off LSEs that have purchased 
insufficient or defaulting supply. We do not believe system operators are currently basing load 
shedding on contract positions, real-time purchases by LSEs, and the real-time performance of 
their suppliers. Even if this were the case, reliability would not be determined by consumers' 
value of lost load, but by the LSE's value of lost load, which would reflect the likelihood and 
severity of regulatory punishment—not a market signal from consumers. 
To summarize Case 2, the case in which there is an adequacy problem, the reliability level is 
determined by regulators or market power and not by competitive energy prices. In fact, industry 
consultants have argued for years that electricity markets need market power to allow suppliers 
to cover fixed costs. This approach is common. But so are regulatory adjustments to guide the 
reliability level. When dispatchers (the engineering arm of the regulator) are worried about 
adequacy, they find more reasons to allow prices to rise and are more generous in their demand 
for operating reserves. When they see the system as overly reliable and prices as too high, they 
                                                 
3 Although VoLL is not measurable, that does not mean it does not exist or does not matter. Although inter-temporal 
preference make it difficult to define in real world situations, the above analysis is rigorous in simplified models. 
The complexities of the real world are extremely unlikely to produce an efficient outcome in situations where simple 
models predict inefficiency.   4
find ways to suppress the spot price. If the reliability problem grows more severe, regulatory 
intervention becomes more open, sometimes resulting in the purchase of capacity. When market 
power becomes more severe, regulatory intervention is also likely but it works to lower prices 
and decrease reliability. This is natural and indeed beneficial, but it is not exactly what 
economics means by a competitive market. 
The common “proof” that a “pure-market” design is doing a “pretty good job” of letting the 
market determine reliability goes as follows. The lights are staying on, and there is no capacity 
market, therefore “the market” must be choosing “about the right level” of capacity. The flaw in 
the proof is that it overlooks both market power and regulators. In fact, “pure-market” 
approaches, are simply inadvertent hoaxes. But the hope for an energy-only, pure-market 
solution, is more deeply flawed than this mechanistic analysis indicates. The concept of an 
energy-only market solving the reliability problem without selling a reliability product, is 
logically impossible. It suggests that “the market” can do something “fairly well” when logic 
shows it cannot do it at all. Here is the argument that “energy-only” competitively determined 
reliability is simply impossible. 
If nothing is known of consumers' utility for reliability, no limits can be put on the level of 
optimal reliability. Current markets have no access to information concerning how consumers 
value reliability. In other words, consumers take no market actions that are even partially based 
on reliability considerations. This is obviously true for consumers that do not have real time 
meters and who cannot be individually interrupted. These customer would be foolish to cut back 
when prices are high, because they cannot receive credit for their efforts, and they would be 
foolish to pay more for reliable service since they cannot physically be given more reliability 
than their neighbor who does not pay for more reliability. Many large consumers do have real-
time meters and some can be interrupted. But, system operators are not prepared to black them 
out based on the performance of their contractual arrangements for power and the performance 
of their suppliers. If they are never blacked out for paying too little, they will not pay for 
reliability. So the market receives no signal of how they value reliability. They may well reduce 
their demand if the spot price rises to say $1000/MWh, but this tells nothing about the costs they 
would suffer if they were blacked out. Their price response is a step toward Case 1, in which 
reliability is prefect, but it provides no information about their VoLL. 
In summary, customers currently reveal nothing about the value they place on reliability. 
Without this information, it makes no sense to think that a market can approximately determine 
how much reliability they would be willing to pay for. Currently, reliability is determined 
entirely by market power and regulators. Neither is ideal but at least regulators may attempt to 
solve the problem. But even unadorned market power is better than one particular “pure-market” 
design that has become popular in Australia and in the Western US. That design calls for 
increasing market risk for consumers so that generators can make more money selling them 
hedges. Although this can increase generator profits by assisting their exercise of market power 
in forward markets, it has nothing to do with determining optimal reliability, and is certainly not 
suggested by any economic theory. This approach is an attempt to regulate the market power in 
forward markets to a higher level as a way of producing the right level of investment and 
reliability. One cannot get much further from the idea of competitive market efficiency.   5
2  The basic reliability-options solution 
As just explained, if a market has an inherent reliability problem, then it must be solved by 
regulation or market power. The goal then is to design a regulatory approach that mimics a 
competitive market as closely as possible. By setting the spot market price cap at VoLL and 
using options to suppress risk and market power while preserving marginal incentives, regulation 
can be confined to the single task for which it is needed: determining the adequate level of 
capacity. Of course, reducing market power moves the market closer to the competitive ideal, but 
what is often overlooked is that reducing risk does too. While, present energy markets are risky 
because of price spikes, these are caused by the extremely low demand elasticity. If the market 
did not have demand-side flaws, demand elasticity would be far higher, and risk far lower. 
Reducing risk moves the market towards this competitive ideal. 
We will now describe a simplified design that illustrates the principles involved. Related 
approaches are described in Bidwell (2005), Chao and Wilson (2004), Cramton and Stoft (2006, 
2007), Oren (2005), and Vazquez et al. (2002). It is assumed to be implemented in a single 
isolated market. Later we will discuss the problem of trade. At first, the energy market will be 
assumed to contain only the real-time market, but later, settlements that include forward markets 
will be described. 
Step one of the design is to set the price cap on the spot market to the best estimate of VoLL. 
Of course this is a poor estimate, but any value in the 3,000 to €30,000 range should provide 
good dispatch incentives. Since VoLL will play no role in determining investment, the level is 
not critical. The difference in energy supplied under a €3,000 cap and a €30,000 cap is 
minuscule, because, with market power well controlled, these prices rarely are reached and by 
the time the price reaches €3,000, there are not many generators that can provide power and are 
choosing not too. 
Step two of the design is to provide load with a complete hedge in the form of a reliability 
option with a strike price of say €300. Load purchases the target quantity of physical capacity 
together with a load-following call option at the strike price. In this way, load is 100% hedged 
from energy prices in excess of €300. If the energy price in an hour is €1000, each supplier has a 
financial obligation to serve its share of load. Since deviations are priced at the €1000 spot price, 
the supplier continues to be motivated by the spot price, although both load and suppliers are 
hedged from price volatility above the €300 price. 
The key point is that all generation still faces the spot price even though it is hedged. 
Suppose a supplier owns 100 MW of capacity. If it provides 80 MW of power for the hour in 
question and has a 90 MW obligation, it is paid €80,000 because the spot price is €1,000, but it 
must pay (90 MW)  €(1000 – 300) as a hedge payment. If it provides 90 MW of power, it is 
paid €90,000 and is obliged to make the same €63,000 option payment. If it produces 100 MW it 
is paid €100,000, and again makes the same hedge payment. For every MW it increases or 
decreases its production, its net revenue increases or decreases by €1,000. 
Note that when the spot price is €300 or above, it makes sense for virtually every generator 
to be producing, since marginal cost typically is less than €300. As long as the suppliers produce 
their share of load, they will earn the strike price for all of their output. In other words, a 
generator with average performance is fully hedged against spot prices above €300 by its   6
physical generator.
4 This approach greatly reduces the risk from weather related price 
fluctuations. It does not however reduce performance risk. Although all risk is costly and hence 
undesirable, performance risk cannot be eliminated without eliminating the performance 
incentive. Generators will argue for a long list of exceptions due to “acts of God,” but virtually 
all of these are to some extent under the generators' control, and since performance risk is quite 
small, it is best to simply ignore these arguments. In the full price market of step 1, no one would 
dare argue for exceptions, even though their excuses would be equally valid (or equally invalid) 
in a pure-market setting. No matter why a generator is out of service when the price is 
€10,000/MWh, no one would consider paying it for power it did not produce due to an “act of 
God.” This obvious fact has proven extremely difficult for suppliers to remember during market 
design negotiations. 
To summarize our progress with the design, the first step (price cap equals VoLL) assured 
that the market conforms to a classic competitive design, although it still includes the currently 
unavoidable demand-side flaws (which lead to the absence of a robust demand response), and the 
compensating intervention of a VoLL price cap. As is well known, with this cap, and ignoring 
risk and market power, the market will provide both optimal dispatch incentives and optimal 
investment incentives. Of course the regulator is in control of investment incentives, and can 
induce any level of reliability. But if the regulator sets the cap to VoLL (which cannot be 
determined by the market), investment will be optimal. 
Step two (the complete hedge) preserves the dispatch incentives perfectly on the generation 
side, but destroys the investment incentive, because although generators face the spot price on 
the margin, their revenues are limited exactly as if there were a price cap at €300/MWh. Why is 
this progress? Two advantages are obvious: a dramatic reduction in risk and in market power. 
The third advantage is that VoLL has become much less important. It no longer affects 
investment. If a higher VoLL is used, the price cap will be higher and the incentive to perform on 
peak will be greater, but because of the hedge, this will not increase the earnings of generators. 
This means changing VoLL does not change investment or adequacy. VoLL is only linked to 
real-time performance and in this role, VoLL makes little difference for the following reason. If 
VoLL and the price cap are €2,000, all functioning generators will produce as much as they can, 
and if VoLL and the cap are €20,000, they will do almost exactly the same thing. Perhaps, at the 
higher value, some load with real-time pricing will be reduced, or some generator will squeeze 
out one more megawatt, but little will change. Because the estimation of VoLL is always 
controversial, this is an advantage. 
Step three, the final step of the design, introduces the capacity auction. This sets the 
payments to generators for providing reliability options just high enough to induce optimal 
investment and adequate capacity. An annual auction is used to purchase new capacity up to the 
level required for reliability. These auctions determine the price of reliability options that is just 
sufficient to induce the required entry. For example, with a strike price of €300/MWh this might 
result in the average annual loss of €40,000 of revenue per MW of capacity relative to the spot 
market of step one. This is often termed the “missing money.” In this case, new entrants will bid 
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auction payment for its capacity. It will be fully hedged, and will still be motivated to run by the full spot price. If its 
marginal cost is extremely high, it may find it more profitable to sell a smaller amount of capacity, so it can exceed 
its share of production and earn the full spot price. These difficulties should be small, and there should be little 
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the price of reliability options down to €40,000/MW-year. If the cost of constructing new 
capacity increases or decreases, due to environmental restrictions or new technology, new 
entrants will bid just enough higher or lower to maintain a normal rate of return. 
The result is that the regulator controls the level of capacity, but the market controls the 
price of capacity and the type and quality of capacity built. Hence the regulatory intervention has 
been strictly limited to the determination of the one factor about which the market has little 
information—the adequate level of capacity. 
Although the auction design requires care to address the potential exercise of market power, 
the following simple procedure would work quite well. Each September an auction is held for 
reliability options, ROs, which take effect on January 1, just over three years in the future. 
Existing generators may choose either to enter the auction with a zero bid, or not to sell ROs. 
New projects are allowed to bid without restriction. The regulator bids a demand curve that 
intersects the target adequacy level at the most recent RO price and slopes down to the right by 
5% in price for each 1% increase in capacity. It slopes up from the same point by 20% for each 
1% decrease in capacity. The auction is held using a descending clock procedure (see Ausubel 
and Cramton 2004). All accepted bids are paid the clearing price, but existing generation 
receives one-year contracts while new generation may choose any contract length up to seven 
years. Once a new generator's initial contract expires it becomes an “existing” generator. If no 
new generation is purchased in a given year, all existing generators that bid, have their contracts 
extended for one year. 
There is one further rule, which assures full hedging and limits market power in both the 
spot and capacity markets. Any generator that does not sell ROs for its full capacity receives 
only the spot price capped at the strike price. In other words, such generators in effect provide 
the hedge without compensation. In fact a few extremely unreliable generators may opt not to 
sell capacity, and others will decide not to because they are selling there capacity into another 
system. These are good reasons and cause no trouble. It is only withholding capacity to exercise 
market power that is discouraged. 
Some designs omit this rule. Objections to it are based on ideological grounds. We find 
these unpersuasive and prefer to rely on economic analysis. As explained by Hogan and Harvey 
(2000) during the California crisis, suppliers will not give up their market power for free by 
entering into long-term contracts. They realize that their market power is valuable, and will 
extract approximately the value of this market power before relinquishing it by selling ROs. This 
rule prevents the exercise of market power in the capacity market, as well as the spot market. 
Only permanent retirements can reduce the quantity of existing supply. 
One puzzle is why the spot price would ever exceed the option’s strike price if all load and 
generation is fully hedged. Remember that suppliers only hedge a specific quantity of power, 
their share of load. Power produced beyond this level is unhedged for the supplier. Not only can 
some suppliers produce more than their share, but some always will, simply because it is 
impossible for a hundred or more suppliers to all supply exactly their share. In any case, the spot 
price can be high, depending on market rules, because the system operator bids a high price or 
because suppliers bid a high price for supply that may be beyond their market share.   8
3  How reliability options work in practice 
There have been concerns that the mandatory RO system requires a centralized day-ahead 
market such as found in the Northeastern ISO's of the US (PJM, ISO-NE, and NYISO). 
Fortunately these concerns are unfounded. There is also concern that the RO mechanism is 
incompatible with a high level of bilateral contracting. In fact there always has been a high level 
of bilateral contracting in New England and other markets where this design has been adopted. 
How ROs integrate with bilateral markets and trade with other markets is explained below. 
Assume a 100 MW generator has sold a reliability option with a strike price of €300, and the 
Transmission System Operator, is handling the reliability market. There are also long-term 
bilateral markets, a day-ahead market run by APX, and a balancing market run by the TSO. 
Currently, European markets can be thought of as two settlement systems. A generator sells 
total energy of QForward in forward markets, either bilateral or centralized like APX, and QForward 
is scheduled with the TSO. The generator then delivers an amount QRT in real time. The forward 
quantity is settled at the privately determined prices regardless of what is delivered in real time, 
while the deviation from the forward sale, QRT – QForward, is paid the balancing market price, 
PBalance. Of course the deviation can be negative, in which case the generator pays the TSO. So 
without reliability options or when the balancing price is below the strike price, the settlement 
works as follows: 
Generator Revenue = PForward  QForward + PBalance  (QRT – QForward) 
With reliability options, and the balancing price above the strike price, the RO is settled 
second in what is essentially a three-settlement system. Each supplier is responsible for a share 
of the real-time load that is proportional to the quantity of reliability options it has sold. For 
example if it has sold 100 MW of options out of a total of 10,000 MW of reliability options, it is 
responsible for 1% of the load in every hour.
5 Call the supplier’s share QShare. The three-
settlement system works as follows: 
Generator Revenue = PForward  QForward + PStrike  (QShare – QForward) + PBalance  (QRT – QShare) 
If the generator supplies exactly its load share, so that QRT = QShare, then it is fully hedged 
against the balancing price. However if it deviates either up or down from its share, it is paid or 
must pay the balancing price. Hence its incentive to perform has not changed, and the balancing 
market continues to play its traditional role. As can be seen, there is not much interaction 
between the forward transactions and the reliability option. In particular there is no reason 
generators cannot sell all of their power in the forward markets and sell reliability options for all 
of their capacity in the capacity market. Three things have changed as a result of the hedge built 
into the reliability option: the average generator earns at most the strike price in the balancing 
market, both load and generation are less at risk, and the forward contract needs only to cover 
prices below the strike price. 
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Notice that the sum over all generators of QRT, the total power delivered, equals the total 
load, which equals the sum over all generators of QShare. This means the sum over all generators 
of PBalance  (QRT – QShare) is zero. This is exactly true, because generation shares are determined 
after the fact. These terms are the incentive payments for under and over performance by 
generators, relative to QShare. So these payments do not affect load, but are payments from poorly 
performing generators to the better performers. As a consequence of this fact, generators do not 
have to be concerned that the TSO will under-procure capacity because, on average, this cannot 
change the total performance payments to generators which always sum to zero. Under-
procurement of capacity will only increase the number of hours when there is a shortage and 
generators are paid the strike price. 
Another concern is that European markets are open to trade between countries. If the price is 
high in Germany, but Dutch generators are under reliability options, they might leave the Dutch 
market where, on average, they can earn only the strike price, and sell as much as they can into 
the German market. To examine this possibility, the settlement must include a term for exports. 
Since the concern is with the effect of reliability options, the real-time price must be above the 
strike price, so it is safe to assume a generator will produce the most it is capable of, QMax. Next 
note that only the power delivered to the domestic balancing market, QDomestic, receives the 
balancing price. The export quantity is then, QMax – QDomestic, and the settlement works as 
follows. 
Generator Revenue = PForward  QForward + PStrike  (QShare – QForward) 
 + PBalance  (QDomestic – QShare) + PExport  (QMax – QDomestic) 
Because the derivative of Generator Revenue with respect to QDomestic is (PBalance – PExport), 
the incentive to export is exactly the same as without reliability options. Hence there is no 
justifiable concern with a disruption of the balance of electricity trade, or a collapse of the 
domestic market. 
Another practical concern is the assignment to load serving entities (LSEs) of responsibility 
for the cost of ROs. Because the options are procured by the TSO, the LSEs are not burdened 
with purchasing ROs and need not make any long-term commitments by purchasing them. This 
is a great advantage because it means LSEs are at little risk from consumers moving from one 
LSE to another. The cost assignment is simply adjusted each year and based on the LSE's 
coincident peak load during the year. This determination is best made after the fact. For example, 
option cost responsibility for 2010 should be based on the peak loads during 2010. To reduce 
randomness in loads on any given day, a weighted average of the three highest peak-load days 
could be used. 
Another practical concern is that load is not exposed to the full spot price because of the 
hedge. Although most load is still not on real-time meters, these are becoming more prevalent. 
Moreover, LSEs can implement various programs to encourage conservation during times of 
peak load, and it would be worthwhile to properly motivate them to do so. This can be 
accomplished as follows. First compute the peak energy costs of each LSE. This is simply the 
integral of its load times Max(0, (PBalance – PStrike)) over the year. Then, since each LSE is 
assigned a reliability share, LShare, based on its coincident peak load, this share can be used to 
compute its share of the total of all peak energy costs. Each LSE then pays a penalty equal to the 
amount by which its actual  peak energy cost exceeds its share of total  peak energy costs. 
Peak-Load Penalty =  peak energy cost – LShare  (Sum of all peak energy costs)   10
The sum of the penalties is zero, and the derivative of a load's penalty with respect to its own 
peak energy cost is (1 – LShare), which is near one as long as LSEs are small. This means that 
purchasing a MW of power, when the balancing price is above the strike price, costs each LSE 
an amount PStrike + (1 – LShare)  (PBalance – PStrike), which is very nearly PBalance. In other words the 
penalty makes the LSEs face the balancing price on the margin even though they pay no more on 
average. There will be some risk to loads from this performance penalty but it is small and it is 
only what is inevitable if loads are to face the real-time price on the margin. They are still 
completely hedged against price spikes caused by weather, nuclear outages, or other events out 
of their control. This same technique can be used by LSEs to pass real-time price signals through 
to their loads equipped with real-time meters. 
One final concern is that reliability options may impose burdensome new information 
requirements. However, the TSOs are already aware of the quantities transacted in the forward 
markets because these must be scheduled. They are also aware of actual production and of which 
generators are exporting how much power. Because the TSO will conduct the capacity auctions, 
it will know who owns the reliability options. It also knows the daily loads of the LSEs, and the 
balancing market prices. This is all the information needed to implement this reliability option 
design. In particular there is no need to collect more information about bilateral transactions. 
4  Reliability options in a hydro-dominated system 
If supply is mainly from hydro-electric generation, the limiting factor is not likely to be 
capacity (the ability to provide energy in peak hours) but rather, firm energy (the ability to 
provide energy in dry periods).
6 As a consequence the TSO will need to purchase firm energy 
options. Just as capacity is the physical basis for reliability options, so firm energy options have a 
physical basis that involves a longer-term supply of energy. Firm energy is defined as the amount 
of energy a generator can deliver per month during an exceptionally dry period (a worst-case 
benchmark). A typical thermal unit is certified at its nameplate capacity times its average 
availability, such as 92% of nameplate. In contrast, a hydro resource’s firm energy may be well 
below its nameplate, say 35%, due to a limited water reservoir and low inflows during dry 
periods. A new unit’s firm-energy contribution is how much less energy the system would have 
without the unit in the worst-case benchmark. 
The second difference in a firm-energy market is the way load-share is defined when the 
real-time price rises above the strike price and the option comes into play. The total quantity of 
the call option follows load, and is divided between thermal and hydro resources as follows. The 
load obligation is first divided among the thermal resources in proportion to their firm energy 
ratings. Once load exceeds the total firm energy ratings of thermal capacity, the excess load is 
divided among the hydro generators in proportion to their firm energy ratings. Economically, this 
division of load between thermal and hydro generators makes sense, since it is consistent with 
efficient dispatch of the units. During scarcity hours the hydro opportunity cost sets the price and 
thermal resources run at capacity if available. One might think that this approach is biased 
against hydro resources, since hydro is asked to do more load following than the thermal 
resources. Indeed, there would be a bias if the ability to follow load was scarce; however, since 
there is a surplus of capacity, load following is not costly and the capability is efficiently priced 
at zero. 
                                                 
6 This applies to stored water. Run of river can be handled like wind in a capacity market.   11
Given these definitions, settlement proceeds exactly as it does in the reliability-options 
market just described. 
In a market in which it is unclear whether capacity or firm energy is the scarce resource to 
achieve generation adequacy, the approach can be enhanced to accommodate both products. 
Each resource is rated for both its capacity and its firm energy, and offers the two products as a 
package. There is a target for each product. The descending clock auction then has two prices, 
one for capacity and one for firm energy. The prices descended until a supply and demand 
balance has been achieved in both products. In a hydro-dominated system, this will imply a zero 
price for capacity and a positive price for firm energy. In a thermal-dominated system, it will 
imply a positive price for capacity and a zero price for firm energy. 
5  Implementation in New England and Colombia 
Reliability markets based on this reliability options approach have been adopted in New 
England's thermal-dominated market (Cramton 2006) and Colombia's hydro-dominated market 
(Cramton and Stoft 2007). The markets are currently in a transition period in which the capacity 
and firm energy prices are set administratively. Both markets will have their first auctions in 
early 2008. Both markets differ somewhat from the specific approach described above. 
New England has locational pricing, so it was important to implement the capacity market 
on a zonal basis, so that adequacy would be achieved throughout New England. Another 
important difference is the way that market power is addressed in the capacity market is more 
complex than what we have suggested above. 
Colombia's firm energy market is quite similar to what we describe above. The strike price 
of the reliability option is only about €100/MWh. This is still above the marginal cost of nearly 
all generation, which means that suppliers have a physical hedge to protect against prices above 
the strike price. Another change is a longer planning period of four years, rather than three to 
accommodate longer-lead time hydro projects. Indeed, to accommodate large hydro products, 
suppliers can sell firm energy up to seven years ahead at the four-year-ahead price, subject to 
some restrictions. The large hydro project is a price taker in the auction, since it is not selling 
firm energy four years head, but up to seven years ahead. At the conclusion of the auction, the 
investor specifies the fraction of the firm energy from the project it desires to lock-in at the 4-
year ahead auction price. Only a fraction of the predicted need for new generation can be sold in 
this way. 
6  Risk analysis based on market data 
In both New England and Colombia, we have examined the supplier risk associated with the 
reliability options approach. We have examined company risk using historical market data, as 
well as detailed market simulations carefully calibrated to the specific market setting. 
The findings in Colombia (Cramton et al. 2007), where we did more detailed simulations, 
are as follows. 
  Lumpy investment means that few new units are added each year. Indeed, in 27% of the 
years no new entry occurs. (This is an overestimate to the extent that the size of 
proposed projects reflect the actual need in the year, as one might expect.)   12
  The mandatory hedge is remarkably successful in reducing risk. In the benchmark case, 
where we assume demand has constant elasticity of –.05 for prices above the strike price 
(a 20% increase in price produces a 1% decline in demand), the hedge reduces aggregate 
profit risk by a factor of 7. More importantly, the hedge reduces company risk by a 
factor of 4.5 in the benchmark case. Even when we assume a high level of demand 
response so that prices remain low during scarcity periods and there is less profit risk to 
start with, the hedge reduces company risk by 55%. 
  A higher strike price increases risk. Increasing the strike price shifts the profit 
distribution toward the no hedge case (a strike price of infinity). This results in a large 
increase in energy rent risk and a small decrease in hedge payment risk. The overall 
impact is a large increase in profit risk. 
Taken together, the simulation results demonstrate the risk reducing benefits of the 
reliability market. Provided there is competitive new entry in response to load growth, the 
reliability market should work well at coordinating investment in new supply, while minimizing 
supplier and consumer risks. 
7 Conclusion 
The forward reliability market approach described here is the product of a systematic 
development based on clear economic principles. Indeed, once it is understood it seems almost 
inevitable. The first step is the classic VoLL pricing system which is known to be both short and 
long-run optimal if VoLL is known and risk and market power are assumed to be costlessly 
suppressed by unspecified means. The second step is to suppress risk and market power, the two 
evils of VoLL pricing, by introducing reliability options. These do not interfere with real-time 
price signals, so on the second step, the market retains the dispatch optimality of classic VoLL 
pricing, but without the problems. 
The second step suppresses a significant amount of generation revenue and thereby destroys 
the investment incentive, so the third step restores it by introducing a capacity market, which 
induces an adequate level of investment by procuring the appropriate quantity of reliability 
options. All generation, new and existing will want to sell reliability options for their full 
capacity because these options fetch a high price relative to the financial cost of the option. 
Participation in this market is guaranteed by the rule that non-participating generators receive the 
spot price capped at the option strike price. 
The auction for procuring reliability options takes place three years in advance of the 
effective date, so that there is time for new entry to back the options. To suppress market power 
in the reliability-option auction, only new capacity bids are allowed to set the price. The auction 
is a descending-clock auction. By inducing investment with an auction instead of high prices, not 
only does the regulator have better control of the average reliability level, but far better 
investment coordination is assured. 
Investment coordination prevents the boom-bust cycles which increase both investor risk 
and reliability risk for consumers. Without an auction, as the market tightens it offers an 
increasingly large prize for the next entrant. However, entry is a secretive process, and so 
simultaneous entry is possible. Aware of this, investors are torn between holding off until the 
prize is large enough to support some simultaneous entry and entering quickly to ward off   13
competition. The optimal strategy is mixed and the outcome chaotic. With an auction, the TSO 
coordinates entry without reducing competition. There are multiple simultaneous bids, but the 
TSO selects only as many as needed. This stability benefits both consumers and investors. 
While there are many concerns about the use of reliability options, with the designs 
specified here, none prove warranted. There is no difficulty deciding which private contracts are 
acceptable substitutes for reliability options, because no substitutes are accepted. One hundred 
percent coverage by reliability options does not interfere with 100% coverage with bilateral 
contracts. Reliability options provide price coverage above the strike price; bilateral contracts 
provide price coverage below the strike price. Although reliability options limit the average real-
time price to the strike price, the marginal price for both load and investors remains the 
balancing market prices. This preserves incentives and prevents any increase in exports relative 
to the present system even on days when other countries have high prices. The benefits of this 
design are significant. The design minimizes risk and market power, while coordinating efficient 
entry. 
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